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Abstract 
This paper examines whether the degree of religiosity in an institutional environment can stimulate the 
emergence of a robust corporate governance system. This study utilises the Nigerian business 
environment as its context and embraces a qualitative interpretivist research approach. This approach 
permitted the engagement of a qualitative content analysis (QCA) methodology to generate insights 
from interviewees. Findings from the study indicate that despite the high religiosity among Nigerians, 
religion has not stimulated the desired corporate governance system in Nigeria. The primary explanation 
for this outcome is the presence of rational ordering over religious preferences thus highlighting the fact 
that religion, as presently understood and practised by stakeholders, is inconsistent with the principles 
underpinning good corporate governance. 
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Introduction  
Until recently, religion has attracted limited attention in organisational research and management (Melé 
& Fontrodona, 2016). Tracey (2012) provided explanations for this development, stating that religion 
is too detached from the exertions of commercial organisations while being sensitive within corporate 
discourse. Given the reasoning in Tracey (2012), the attainment of corporate objectives assumes a 
consequentialist stance (Kaptein & Wempe, 2002) which conflicts with the principles of religion (see 
Harrison, 2006). Consequentialism encourages stakeholders to ignore frameworks that permit religious 
consciousness in corporations (Aldohni, 2014). While the literature (e.g., Elson et al., 2007; Diaconu & 
Dumitrescu, 2013; Kim & Daniel, 2016) has demonstrated similarities between the principles 
underlying both religion and corporate mechanisms (such as corporate governance), it has equally 
acknowledged the relationship between both concepts. This preceding accounts for the growing traction 
in corporate governance scholarship, and in particular, the examination of the relationship between both 
concepts (Elson, O'Callaghan & Walker, 2007; Aldohni, 2014). Despite these efforts, the literature 
suffers from a scant investigation of the relationship among developing economies. We therefore seek 
to contribute to the existing debate by addressing the research question: 
Does the degree of religiosity in an institutional environment influence the practice of 
corporate governance?   
A growing body of literature (see, for example, Barro & McCleary, 2003; Guiso, Sapienza, & 
Zingales, 2003; Kuran, 2009; Du et al., 2014) has identified the need to examine religion in corporations. 
Despite this call, the literature remains inconclusive regarding the influence of religion on corporate 
governance. Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2009) and Vitell et al. (2016) suggest that religiosity can 
deter unethical corporate behaviour, arguing that firms in high religiosity nations are less likely to 
engage in poor corporate governance practices. In contrast, Zuckerman (2008) reports low levels of 
religiosity in the Scandinavia yet Strand, Freeman and Hockerts (2015) note that the Scandinavian 
countries are global leaders in concepts such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability.  
Various rationalisations have emerged to explain the inconsistencies in the literature. The 
articulation of the preceding rationalisations has relied on institutional theory and its key components 
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such as institutions and institutional environments (Daniel, Cieslewicz & Pourjalali, 2012; Volonte, 
2015). Kuran (2009), for instance, opined that the variations in institutional environments trigger 
positive and negative results reported in the relationship between religion and corporate performance. 
Iyer (2015) also notes that increased studies of religion outside the Western world contribute to growing 
exploration of religion among corporations. Findings in Kuran (2009) and Iyer (2015) suggest that 
differences in institutional environments shape the effect of religion on corporations. Further, Castles 
(1994) emphasise that differences in religious adherence in developed and developing nations promote 
a better understanding of cross-national variance in policies. Whereas the developed countries have 
attracted considerable interest, the literature examining religion and corporate governance suffers from 
an important lacuna. A WIN-Gallup (2012) survey (see Table 1) reveals that the top 10 religious 
countries in the world are developing economies. Given that developing countries have attracted limited 
research, we maintain that the religion-corporate governance literature will benefit from an 
investigation of the relationship in developing countries.  
Table 1: Top 10 Religious Populations in the World 
Countries A Religious Person (%) Not a Religious Person (%) 
Ghana 96 2 
Nigeria 93 4 
Armenia 92 3 
Fiji 92 5 
Macedonia 90 8 
Romania 89 6 
Iraq 88 9 
Kenya 88 9 
Peru 86 8 
Brazil 85 13 
Source: WIN-Gallup (2012) 
This preceding provides a compelling case to examine the relationship between religion and 
corporate governance in under-researched contexts. To proxy for developing economies, we adopt 
Nigeria as our study context based on the following reasons: First, Nigeria is Africa’s biggest economy 
(Masetti, 2014). Second, PwC Economics (2013) estimates that the country will rank among the top 20 
economies of the world, based on GDP, by 2050. Third, it is among the top three religious countries in 
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the world (Table 1), and lastly, Ukiwo (2003) and Sampson (2014) contend that religion has 
significantly influenced economic, social and political outcomes in Nigeria.  
Thus, relying on insights from Nigeria, two generic categories explaining the relationship 
between religion and corporate governance emerged from our data. The first generic category (religion 
and stakeholder conduct) shows that stakeholder attitude influences the relationship between religion 
and corporate governance. The second generic category (religious herding) indicates that corporate 
governance outcomes reflect the preferences of religious leaders. These findings stress the distinction 
between religion and corporate governance, suggesting that high religiosity countries must isolate 
religion from corporate governance matters. Further, our findings strengthen calls for a review of 
corporate governance regulatory systems in developing economies given that some of these countries 
adopt a principles-based regulatory approach that suffers from institutional voids.    
In generating our findings, this paper commences by providing a background into religion and 
corporate governance in Nigeria. Next, we engage institutional theory as our theoretical base and 
undertake a review of the extant literature examining the relationship between religion and corporate 
governance. The methodology, based on a qualitative, interpretivist epistemology, is then presented 
followed by the analysis and discussion of the paper’s findings. The paper concludes by highlighting 
the practical implications of the research and offering suggestions for future research. 
 
Background – Religion and Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
Corporate governance in Nigeria has a relatively long history. Adegbite and Nakajima (2011) traced 
the history of corporate governance in Nigeria to the colonial era (pre-1960) when British companies 
dominated the country’s private sector. These companies originated within the context of colonial 
imperialism (Amaeshi et al., 2006) as their relationship with the western world characterised their 
evolution. During this era, management possessed absolute powers (Ahunwan, 2002). Thus, agency 
challenges were rife among firms as there was a limited challenge to management’s prerogative in the 
discharge of their responsibilities (Yakasai, 2001). Further, Adegbite, Amaeshi and Amao (2012) note 
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that shareholders at the time were very passive, as shareholder activism was non-existent. These 
unethical practices were encouraged and sustained due to the absence of a dedicated and defined 
mechanism for monitoring and supervising the activities of management at the time (Amao & Amaeshi, 
2008). This resulted in unprecedented levels of corporate mismanagement, drawing attention to the 
owner-manager complications among businesses (Uche, 1999). These problems contributed to the first 
banking crisis in the country during the colonial era (Alford, 2010), prompting calls for governance 
regulations.  
Following the enactment of various governance regulations, the introduction of Companies and 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA) in 1990 signalled a significant milestone in company regulation in Nigeria 
(Ogbuozobe, 2009). Though CAMA (1990) was not exclusively devoted to corporate governance, it 
represented the first definitive attempt at entrenching good governance among Nigerian corporations 
(Inyang, 2009). However, the year 2003 marked the commencement of corporate governance regulation 
in Nigeria with the enactment of a Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance for publicly quoted 
companies by the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (Ogbechie & Koufopoulos, 
2007). Despite the interest that SEC Code (2003) (updated in 2011) generated, its implementation and 
enforcement mechanism was weak (Ofo, 2010). The updated code addressed the problem areas in the 
2003 Code and incorporated key corporate governance issues such as whistleblowing and independent 
directorship (Ofo, 2011). Despite the comprehensiveness of the SEC Code (2011), criticism has trailed 
some of its provisions. Adegbite (2012), for instance, notes that there is no clarity regarding the adoption 
of a rules-based or a principles-based mechanism in the Code. Adegbite (2012) also highlighted 
multiple directorship concerns, noting that it is unclear whether an independent director in one company 
can hold a similar position in another, particularly when both firms are related (Adegbite, 2012). 
The above issues suggest that multiple challenges, heightened by institutional voids (Amaeshi, 
Adegbite & Rajwani, 2016), hamper corporate governance in Nigeria. For instance, Okike and Adegbite 
(2012) stressed that corruption is at the centre of governance challenges in Nigeria, finding expression 
in every facet of the country’s economy (Okike, 2007). The corporate environment tolerates high-
profile corporate corruption by managers and directors in publicly listed companies (Adegbite et al., 
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2012). Further, weak regulatory enforcement obstructs corporate governance in Nigeria, evident in the 
disconnection between regulations and enforcement (Afolabi & Amupitan, 2015). The inability to 
enforce regulations follows the disequilibrium between the authority of regulators and the influence of 
operators, as the power of operators typically overwhelms the authority of regulators (Okaro & 
Tauringana, 2012). The problems of corruption and weak regulatory enforcement react to the country’s 
poor institutional arrangements. Nakpodia et al. (2016) assert that institutional weaknesses, 
characterised by institutional voids, accelerate the challenges of corruption and weak enforcement. 
Adegbite and Nakajima (2011) note that institutions in Nigeria lack the robustness to check agency 
problems among Nigerian corporations, thus managers predictably ‘work to the answer, mark their own 
examination scripts, score themselves distinctions and initiate the applause’ (Yakasai, 2001, pp. 240). 
Several influences have triggered the challenges confronting corporate governance in Nigeria. 
These factors include the political culture of corruption and bribery, ethnic tensions and rivalries, poorly 
functioning markets (e.g., information asymmetries), and a lack of adequate infrastructure (Ahunwan, 
2002). However, there is a growing literature (see, for example, Ajaegbu, 2012; Ntamu et al., 2014; 
Sampson, 2014) investigating how religion impacts the social, political and corporate landscape in 
Nigeria. This scholarship has thrived given the high religiosity levels in Nigeria.  Religion, because of 
its emphasis on philanthropy, prudence, morality and ethics, may inspire a positive governmental, 
organisational and individual approach to corporate governance. In contrast, religion (or some of its 
interpretations or practices) may equally impede responsible governance behaviours. As Nigeria 
provides the study context, the paper discusses the religious landscape in Nigeria. 
Religion in Nigeria is highly complex and diverse, characterised by multiple religious customs 
that include indigenous religions, the various strands of Christianity and Islam (Adogame, 2010). 
Onapajo (2012) suggested that Nigerians are more loyal to religion than the state. The growing trend of 
religiosity, the phenomenal rise in the number of worship centres and advent of religious elites 
(influential clergies) in the country underpin increasing religious consciousness. Religion in Nigeria 
dates to the pre-colonial era. During this period, Nigerians practised indigenous religions, which they 
believed is their source of existence (Ntamu et al., 2014). The prevailing belief that these religions offer 
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divine provision, guidance and protection were central to their growing relevance. However, Onapajo 
(2012) and Ebhomienlen and Ukpebor (2013) noted that the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914 and the 
emergence of national politics expedited the role of religion as a source of ethnic identity and political 
mobilisation in the country. These events, combined with the demonization and paganization of 
traditional religions (Onapajo, 2012), accelerated the emergence of Christianity and Islam in Nigeria. 
The advent of Christianity and Islam accounted for the gradual erosion in the number of adherents of 
traditional religions, as most believers of traditional religions sought to be a Christian or a Muslim 
(Onapajo, 2012). Further, Yesufu (2016) states that there is no written doctrine for traditional religion. 
Therefore, it lacks the formality typically associated with Christianity and Islam. Consequently, 
Christianity and Islam have emerged as the two dominant religious groups in Nigeria (Ebhomienlen & 
Ukpebor, 2013; Oshewolo & Maren, 2015). At 90 million each, Paden (2015) notes that the population 
of Christians and Muslims is evenly divided. 
Over the last century, religion has influenced economic, social and political outcomes in 
Nigeria. Limbs and Fort (2000) contend that religion is one of the three key elements shaping business 
practices in Nigeria (the others being ethnicity and language). Further, Adi (2005) noted that the belief 
in the supernatural (i.e. religion) is core to the worldview of Nigerians. The WIN-Gallup (2012) survey 
reinforces Adi’s (2005) assertion. The country also ranks amongst countries with the highest number 
of religious people in the world. With a population of 186 million (World Bank, 2016), there are over 
180 million religious people in Nigeria (Paden, 2015). Ukah (2015) also highlighted the economic value 
of religion to Nigeria, stating that religion constitutes one of Nigeria’s visible exports in the 21st century. 
 
Theory 
The variations reported in the literature examining the connection between corporate governance and 
religion indicates that the context (or institutional environment) influences the effect of religion on 
corporate governance. Differences in religious practices and beliefs across institutional environments 
produces inconsistencies in governance outcomes. This dissimilarity was stressed in Volonte (2015), 
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noting that within single institutional frameworks, firms in Swiss-French and Roman-Catholic areas are 
more likely to use one-tier boards but in Swiss-German and Protestant areas, two-tier boards are more 
prevalent. Thus, this paper adopts an institutional theoretical framework to understand how religiosity, 
triggered by institutional distinctiveness, influence the practice of corporate governance in Nigeria. 
Institutional theory, according to Scott (2014), attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects 
of social structure and considers the processes by which structures emerge as established standards for 
social behaviour. This view of institutional theory emphasises organisational connectedness to the 
institutional environment, explaining why and how organisations relate to their institutional 
environments (Suddaby, 2010). Institutional environments typify the elaboration of rules that 
corporations must accept to acquire legitimacy and support (Scott, 2014). Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
acknowledges the importance of institutional environment, suggesting that institutional environment, 
rather than market pressures, produces the formal structures in an organisation. However, the capacity 
of the institutional environment to trigger formal structures in organisations is contingent upon its 
stability. Judge, Douglas and Kutan (2008), for example, contends that differences in institutional 
environments account for the inconsistencies in global corporate governance.   
Institutional environments are characterised by ‘institutions’ which refers to accepted socio-
economic beliefs, norms, and practices associated with various aspects of society, such as education, 
law, politics, and notably religion (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Institutions not only represent a system 
of established and accepted social rules that structure social interactions (Hodgson, 2006), but comprise 
elements that provide stability and meaning to social life (Scott, 2014). This proposes that institutions 
possess the capacity to check behaviour (North, 1990) and exhibits a permanency characteristic that 
supports the emergence of robust institutional environments (Dulbecco & Renard, 2003). Thus, 
institutions are enduring entities (Maguire & Hardy, 2009) maintained over extended periods, and 
highly resistant to change (Zucker, 1987).  
To extend the notion of institutions, Scott (2014) conceived three pillars of institutions, namely 
the regulative, the normative and the cultural-cognitive. The regulative pillar focuses on regulations and 
associated processes (North, 1990) while the normative pillar focuses on the prescriptive, evaluative 
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and obligatory aspects of social life (Scott, 2014). The cultural-cognitive pillar concentrates on changes 
in conceptual beliefs, mental models, and the interpretations of shared meanings as organisations 
embrace change (Palthe, 2014). These pillars emerged along three dimensions – obligation (the extent 
to which actors are bound to obey), precision (the degree to which rules specify required conduct) and 
delegation (the degree to which third parties are granted authority to apply rules) (Scott, 2014). 
Given that this study examines the link between corporate governance and religion in a weak 
institutional environment, the elements of the normative (e.g. social obligation, shame/honour) and 
cultural-cognitive (e.g. mimetic, shared understanding) pillars of institution provide a convincing basis 
to analyse corporate governance and religion in Nigeria. This is because, on the one hand, the normative 
pillar emphasises normative rules that initiate a prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory component into 
social life (Scott, 2014). The normative pillar suggests that change stems from social obligation rather 
than mere expedience. We, therefore, argue that a sense of duty and moral obligation represent the 
primary drivers of change. In empowering and enabling change, normative systems not only oblige 
checks on behaviour (North, 1990) but also outline legitimate channels to achieve valued ends (Palthe, 
2014). This reinforces the belief, sense of duty and obligation of members even when they do not 
identify with the rationale that birthed the change, and there is a lack of belief regarding the success of 
the change. This indecision by normative agents informs their ‘ought to’ disposition as against the 
regulative pillar that reflects a more assertive ‘have to’ stance or the ‘want to’ perspective of the 
cognitive pillar (Palthe, 2014).  
On the other hand, the cultural-cognitive pillar focuses on the cognitive dimensions of human 
existence i.e. the internalised symbolic representation of the world by human beings shapes their 
response to the external world (Scott, 2014). An example is a mimetic mechanism where the behaviour 
of individuals reflects a tendency to imitate other people, subconsciously. This is consistent with the 
intent of most religions, as they take advantage of individual’s desire for factional or group membership 
(Henisz & Levitt, 2011). Religion, as a social change instrument, seeks to provoke changes in 
individuals that make them behave in a manner comparable to a specific group. The institutional 
environment can also provoke mimetic pressures. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) enlightened that 
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environments that create symbolic uncertainty encourage imitation. This links with the position in 
Coşgel and Miceli (2009), and Norris and Inglehart (2011) which alludes that religion thrives in weak 
institutional environments. Further, religion also exhibits the logic of orthodoxy because adherents 
adopt routines as ‘taken for granted’ to emphasise ‘the way we do things’ in a specific setting (Scott, 
2014). This behaviour, over time, is internalised to reinforce beliefs and assumptions.   
Noticeably, the assessment of the relationship between religion and corporate governance 
especially in developing economies demand the engagement of broader institutional pillars. Whereas 
corporate governance in many countries have adopted a ‘have to’ (Regulation) system, contrasting 
results emerged in weaker institutional environments. For instance, Adegbite (2012) notes that in 
Nigeria, weak institutions diminish institutional effectiveness, allowing agents to embrace the ‘ought 
to’ disposition associated with the normative system in broadening their choices. Equally, poverty and 
other similar problems have encouraged mimetic pressures (cultural-cognitive pillar) amongst religious 
devotees such that they imitate their religious leaders intuitively (Abioje, 2011). Consequently, the 
growing religiosity among Nigerians draws from the perception of religion as a social and moral 
obligation, an instrument of social change, and as a medium for building and sharing common beliefs.  
 
Empirical Literature Review and Research Agenda 
There are various descriptions of religion. To enhance understanding of the concept, Harrison (2006) 
categorised the many definitions of religion into intellectual, functional and affective. The intellectual 
view of religion emphasises the belief in a particular object or being, such as the belief in an eternal 
God (as postulated by James Martineau), but this perspective also identifies other prominent features of 
religion such as piety and faith (Harrison, 2006). The functional religion concentrates on the function 
of religion as its major defining characteristic, though Frazer (1990) noted that the function that religion 
serves is not always consistent with the position of advocates of intellectual religion. Consequently, the 
function of religion reflects an even broader perspective of religion.   
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The preceding is evident in the affective definition of religion, which focuses on the emotional 
aspects that complement the practice of a specific religion (Corrigan, 2008).  For example, religion can 
help individuals to cope with ‘negative emotions related to existential concerns’ (Cohen, Keltner, & 
Rozin, 2004, pp. 734) given its power to ascribe meaning to negative life events. The affective definition 
thus presents a dual proposition described as ‘experiential-expressive’ (Lindbeck, 1984, pp. 31). While 
this phrase not only buttresses the broad dimension of religion advocated by proponents of intellectual 
religion, it aids the interpretation of religious doctrines as indicators of inner feelings, attitudes, 
behavioural preferences and orientations. Though Geertz (1973) presented a similar account of religion, 
the attributes of religion identified in Geertz (1973) and Lindbeck (1984) such as morals, ethics and 
fairness are fundamental to the corporate governance concept (see Grullon et al., 2009; Du et al., 2014). 
In fact, Larcker and Tayan (2015) suggests that religion plays a key role in shaping corporate 
governance. 
Owing to socio-cultural and institutional differences, defining corporate governance is difficult 
(Kim & Daniel, 2016). Whereas Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) show that good 
corporate governance creates higher firm value among U.S. firms, Daniel et al. (2012) maintain that it 
is unclear if similar outcomes will hold in countries where institutional dynamics affect corporate 
governance implementation. Despite this challenge, we adopt the broader description of corporate 
governance in Bonini, Alkan and Salvi (2012). Bonini et al. (2012) state that corporate governance 
facilitates proper management of financial and corporate resources by aligning the incentives of 
stakeholders. This view identifies an extensive range of features, but Kim and Daniel (2016) note that 
there is no one-size-fits-all approach to good corporate governance. This is because factors such as 
economic, legal, cultural and particularly religion can accelerate good corporate governance practices 
in a country (Kim & Daniel, 2016). Indeed, in the search for an enduring corporate governance system, 
the integration of principles related to religion (e.g. morality, see Aldohni, 2014) has repeatedly been 
proposed. For instance, Guiso et al. (2003) assert that religious beliefs link with ‘good’ economic 
attitudes, where ‘good’ represents conduciveness to higher per-capita income and growth. 
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Therefore, it is useful to explore the nexus between religion and corporate governance. In Elson 
et al. (2007), the examination of fiscal oversight and financial management practices in a religious 
organisation reveals that not only do churches establish fiscal management controls but their practices 
thrive on strict adherence to religious principles. Du et al. (2014) also presented evidence signifying 
that religion (Buddhism) is significantly positively associated with corporate environmental 
responsibility (CER), arguing that the elements of religion serve as social norms to evoke interest 
towards social responsibility. Also, Mohammad et al. (2015) demonstrated that the Islamic work ethic 
positively and significantly affects organisational behaviour. 
Gul and Ng (2016) extended the above arguments, noting that firms in more religious areas 
demonstrate higher morality that translates to higher assurances and fewer irregularities in their 
financial statements. Likewise, the influence of Christianity (Blasco & Zølner, 2010) and Islam (Jamali, 
Safieddine, & Rabbath, 2008) on social responsibility is examined.  It is also noteworthy that Jamali et 
al. (2008) observed that managers consider corporate governance to be a crucial pillar for sustainable 
CSR. They, however, noticed that manager’s orientation is rooted in religious principles, thereby 
enabling the emergence of a philanthropic perspective to CSR. Hilary and Hui (2009) provided further 
evidence of the positive effect of religion on corporate governance. They investigated the link between 
individual religiosity and risk aversion, and in El Ghoul et al. (2012), findings indicate that firms 
domiciled in high religiosity countries enjoy cheaper financing costs. 
Despite the positives linked to religion, Sommer, Bloom, and Arikan (2013) report that religion 
may impact responsible behaviour in the corporate sphere, e.g., faith-based discrimination at work, or 
faith-based objections to employee benefits. Kuran (2009) also noted that religious dispositions inform 
the deliberate act of disallowing women from accessing education in some societies. The concern here 
is that a lack of education among women may restrict corporate performance in such societies. 
Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagné (2008) argued that firms with a high proportion of women 
in both their management and governance structures create sufficient value to keep up with normal 
equity market returns. 
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Aldohni (2014) also stated that religious values might not provide the necessary instant morality 
fix hence stakeholders must be realistic in their expectations of the effect of religion on corporate 
governance. Ukiwo (2003) also explored the disconnect between religion and corporate governance, 
maintaining that religion accounts for the several political and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria as religious 
devotees strive to impose their religious dispositions on other religious groups. The implication for 
corporate governance is that such societies constantly experience religious conflicts, with associated 
economic consequences (Kuran, 2009). 
While the connection between religion and corporate governance is inconclusive owing to the 
reported variation in outcomes, the significance of religion to other economic concepts deserves 
attention. Grim, Clark, and Snyder (2014) established that religious freedom contributes to better 
economic and business outcomes as their findings revealed a positive relationship between global 
economic competitiveness and religious freedom. The study suggested that the more people could 
practice their religion, the more competitive the global economy will become. The results were also 
supported by Pati (2014). Pati (2014) examined the role of religion, as the moral leader of civil society 
in addressing concerns relating to crime. Specifically, Pati (2014) argued that religion offers an 
appropriate framework for tackling the major causes of trafficking. This is because, religion, both 
directly or indirectly, provokes societal change and shapes policy at the local, regional or global levels. 
However, Pati (2014) isolates the degree of religiosity in their study context. This impact attempts at 
generalising their findings.  
Similar concerns are evident in Kim and Daniel (2016). While the study indicated that religion 
has a strong effect on corporate governance practices, the context of the study isolates developing 
economies. The study used archival data from a panel sample of 32 countries, but the highest ranked 
economies in the study are the UK, Canada, Ireland and the US. However, these countries do not feature 
among the top 10 religious countries in the world (see Table 1). In fact, only Brazil (ranked at No. 10 
in Table 1) featured in Kim and Daniel’s (2016) study. Further, of the 32 countries analysed, 21 are 
Christian (Protestants and Catholics) countries while only 3 are Islamic countries. This may potentially 
obscure the study findings considering its generous Christianity-based dataset.      
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The above review highlights the incompleteness of the literature examining the relationship 
between religion and corporate governance. Evidence (Sampson, 2014; Kim & Daniel, 2016) suggests 
that the disposition towards religion amongst countries informs the degree to which religion contributes 
to corporate practices in specific institutional contexts (see Castles, 1994). This scholarship trajectory, 
typically overwhelmed by institutional variations (Guiso et al., 2003), reinforces the observation that 
countries with a dominant religion are likely to have many of their policies shaped by that religion 
(Kempf Jr, 2008). From the review undertaken, there are sufficient grounds to contend that the literature 
has not paid sufficient attention to understanding how variations in institutional environments can 
influence religious outcomes relative to corporate governance. Also, the literature has considerably 
isolated insights from the most religious countries in the world. This oversight plays down the 
robustness of reported findings. Therefore, given the many contrasting findings in the literature, this 
paper seeks to generate insights to understand how religion affects corporate governance in Nigeria. 
The paper proceeds by presenting the methodology employed in this study. 
  
Data and Methodology 
This paper explores how the social phenomena of religion inform corporate governance practices. 
Specifically, this paper examines whether ‘the degree of religiosity in an institutional environment 
influence the practice of corporate governance’. In addressing the preceding objective, this research 
adopts a high religiosity context (Nigeria). As stressed in Okike et al. (2015) and Adeyemi (2010), the 
weaknesses in institutional elements and the data challenges in Nigeria suggest that this study will 
benefit from a direct engagement with stakeholders. Consequently, this paper adopts a qualitative, 
interpretivist methodology. 
 Qualitative research addresses questions connected with developing an understanding of the 
meaning and experience dimensions of human lives and social worlds (Fossey et al., 2002). As this 
study examines the relationship between religion and corporate governance, Corbin and Strauss (2015) 
establishes the appropriateness of adopting a qualitative research strategy. Corbin and Strauss (2015) 
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explained that qualitative research enables researchers to describe and explain persons’ experiences, 
behaviours, interactions and social contexts that underpin the phenomena under investigation.  
The value of qualitative research links with the source of data. In Nigeria, the reliability and 
validity of publicly-available (secondary) data remain contentious (Adeyemi, 2010). To overcome 
issues linked to data reliability, Adeyemi (2010) recommended the collection and use of primary data. 
This informs the use of primary data in this research. A review of qualitative studies (see, for instance, 
Adegbite, 2015; Nakpodia et al., 2016) indicate that the use of interviews is the dominant data collection 
technique in qualitative scholarship. Interviews enable researchers to ‘understand the world from the 
subject’s point of view, to unfold the meaning of people’s experiences’ (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, pp. 
1). It involves asking research participants a series of open-ended questions (see Appendix for Interview 
Guide) to generate in-depth qualitative data to solve a problem (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 
2012). These views, among other benefits (see Bryman, 2015), informed the use of interviews as the 
data collection instrument in this study. 
Flick (2014) informed that in an interview-based study, it is important to decide whom to 
interview, and from which group. As this study focused on the connection between religion and 
corporate governance practices in Nigeria, a considerable number of interviewees (corporate executives) 
came from companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) (the foremost stock exchange in 
Nigeria). These executives are CEOs, board members and other senior management staffs such as 
executive directors, assistant general managers and senior managers. Participants were selected using 
the judgement technique (Marshall, 1996), and the selection procedure was informed by pre-determined 
characteristics such as position and work experience (see Corbetta, 2003). In addition to corporate 
executives, two other categories of interviewees participated in this study i.e. regulators (from relevant 
regulatory agencies) and corporate governance consultants. Nigerian corporations, in recent times, have 
engaged the services of corporate governance consultants, who have previously held executive positions 
(such as CEO and Directorships) in some Nigerian firms. 
The decision to incorporate these three stakeholder categories is to generate rich and broad 
insights concerning the link between corporate governance and religion. Table 2 presents a breakdown 
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of these participants, and their religious affiliations. Data were collected until data saturation (see Mason, 
2010) was achieved. Data saturation indicates the collection of satisfactory data to address the study 
objectives (Walker, 2012). After undertaking some interviews, successive interviews did not generate 
new insights. Consequently, further coding was no longer feasible (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006) as 
data from successive interviews were categorised under existing codes. In total, 22 interviewees 
participated in the study. Twelve (12) interviewees are corporate executives (denoted by E) from various 
organisations listed on the NSE, seven (7) participants are regulators (denoted as R) from relevant 
regulatory agencies while the remaining three (3) interviewees are consultants (denoted as C). 
Table 2: Profiling Research Participants 
 
Christians Muslims Professional Affiliations Total 
   
Law Economics Business & 
Management 
Finance & 
Accounting 
 
Executives 8 4 1 2 4 3 12 
Regulators 3 4 2 1 3 2 7 
Consultants 2 1 1 0 2 1 3 
TOTAL 13 9 4 3 9 6 22 
 
Corporate governance seeks to address the concerns of shareholders but Adegbite et al., (2012) 
and Uche, Adegbite and Jones (2016) inform that shareholder activism in Nigeria is weak. Even so, we 
considered the shareholding profile of the three stakeholder groups before their participation in this 
study. The executives, regulators and consultants in this study are major shareholders in organisations 
listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. In addition, the skillset of these participants is considerably 
diverse. Table 2 shows the professional background of participants, which include law, economics, 
business and management, and finance and accounting. Thus, their participation in this study offers the 
added benefit of generating data from a varied shareholder and professional perspectives.  
The nature of the research problem, the profiles of research participants and the attitude towards 
research especially in developing economies meant that the achievement of the paper’s objectives was 
dependent on the first named author’s ability to access interviewees. To overcome this concern, 
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‘personal contacts’ were used to reach suitable respondents. Nigeria, according to the cultural 
framework of Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010) is a collectivist society. Collectivism describes 
a society that embodies a tightly-knit framework where individuals expect their relatives or group 
members to provide for them in exchange for absolute loyalty (Hofstede et al., 2010). Thus, the 
participants identified, taking into account agreed selection criteria, emerged from personal contacts. 
This was possible as the first named author had work experience spanning about a decade in Nigeria. 
These participants came from a pool of executives, regulators and consultants with whom the author 
has had business interactions. In addition to using personal contacts, we used snowballing strategy 
(Denscombe, 2010) as the initial participants identified referred the first named author to other potential 
participants whom they think fulfil the criteria defined by the authors.  
Next, we present the data analysis procedure. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) and Elo and Kyngäs 
(2008) asserted that qualitative content analysis (hereafter denoted as QCA) is one of the most 
commonly-used techniques for analysing qualitative data. This is because, as Schreier (2012) argued, 
QCA integrates many features of qualitative research such as interpretiveness, flexibility, reflexivity 
and inductiveness (Flick, 2014). In this paper, QCA is undertaken using a coding frame (see Figure 1) 
(Schreier, 2012), which enables the researcher to identify relevant aspects of transcribed data and focus 
on those aspects. The coding frame is designed to incorporate three thematic categories namely the 
main, generic and sub-category (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). An abstraction process, which involves 
articulating a general description of the research concerns by generating categories (see Polit & Beck, 
2012), is followed. This process facilitated the classification of codes into sub-categories, generic 
categories and subsequently, the main category. Computer software (NVivo 10) aided data management 
and enabled the examination of relationships between categories. 
As previously noted, the coding frame in Figure 1 reveals three levels of themes. The first level 
of themes that emerged from the coding process is the as ‘sub-categories.’ Subcategories represent the 
relevant contributions or comments by research participants (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). Following this 
procedure, the next class of grouping emerged.  These new, higher order groups (Burnard, 1991) 
represent the generic categories (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008) (see Figure 1). The generic categories enabled 
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further consolidation of sub-categories and facilitated effective comparison of research findings across 
the (generic) categories. The grouping and classification of data embody the abstraction stage of 
analysis. In the abstraction stage, a final category emerges.  This category i.e. the main category permits 
the formulation of a general description of the research concerns (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). Thus, this paper 
continues with the presentation of the empirical findings, based on two generic categories i.e. religion 
and shareholder conduct, and religious herding (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Coding Frame for Data Classification 
Relevance of Religion
Religious Embeddedness in 
Corporate Organisations
Corporate Governance and 
Religious Principles
Stakeholder Attitude
Systemic Corruption
Growing Influence of Religious 
Leaders
Social Profiling
Religious Leaders in the Corporate 
Space
Religion as  Means to an End 
Religion and Stakeholder 
Conduct
Religious Herding
Religiosity as a 
Catalyst for Good 
Corporate Governance?
SUB-CATEGORIESGENERIC CATEGORIESMAIN CATEGORY
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Empirical Findings and Discussion 
Religion and Stakeholder Conduct 
This generic category embodies the sub-categories addressing the relevance of religion, religious 
embeddedness in corporations, the link between corporate governance and religious principles, 
stakeholder attitude and systemic corruption.   
Relevance of Religion 
Corporate governance ensures that organisations are appropriately directed and controlled (Cadbury, 
1992). While C2 noted that corporate governance entails ethical business behaviour, E6 stated that: 
(Corporate governance) is ensuring that corporate entities are run in a manner that maximum 
value is derived from the management of the resources of that corporate entity, bearing in mind 
that the managers …. are under trust. 
Literature indicates that corporate governance is affected by various influences (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003; Okike et al., 2015). This study examines whether religion affects corporate governance, given 
that religion is one of the three drivers of business activities in Nigeria (Limbs & Fort, 2000). Most 
respondents agreed that religion is relevant to corporate governance, stressing that the core principles 
of religion (e.g. morality, ethics) are consistent with corporate governance. E9, for example, states that: 
Religion plays a significant role (in corporate governance). It preaches fairness, ethics and the 
need to consider others before oneself. Corporate governance is an offshoot of what religion is 
all about. I think religion affects corporate governance positively. 
This suggests that countries with high religiosity provide an ideal environment for corporate governance 
(Kim & Daniel, 2016). El Ghoul et al. (2012) show that organisations that operate in high religiosity 
environment benefit from lower finance costs. Indeed, the growing relevance of religion implies that 
corporations and national institutions in Nigeria evolve with a disposition towards religion. This 
emphasises the importance of (components of) the institutional environment (e.g. religion) in 
influencing formal organisational outcomes (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Adi (2005) admitted that the 
belief in the supernatural is core to the worldview of Nigerians. Similarly, Adamo (2001) opined that 
the richest and the most important heritage of Africa is religion, adding that it shapes the cultural, social, 
political and economic activities on the continent. 
20 
 
However, the relevance of religion relies on the institutional environments. While our data and 
literature (Ntamu et al., 2014; Sampson, 2014) reveal that religion is a key economic factor among 
developing economies, Kuran (2009) and Norris and Inglehart (2011) argue that developed economies 
consider the relevance of religion as insignificant. Stastna (2013) also found that poor countries have 
the highest proportion of people who identify with a religion. Our data denote that the poor state of the 
Nigerian economy accounts for the surge in religiosity in the last few decades. We, therefore, argue that 
the relevance of religion to corporate governance is subjective, defined by the state of an institutional 
environment.  
Religious Embeddedness in Corporate Organisations 
The growth in religiosity has stimulated religious intrusion in corporate Nigeria. Religious leaders are 
increasing influencing board decision-making processes especially in board appointments (Onapajo, 
2012; Nakpodia et al., 2016). Participants affirm that board membership in some organisations reflects 
the main religion in that organisation. R4 states that: 
In Nigerian business, religion is always dominant. … (Most of the) board members and 
employees (belong to that religion). 
C1 added that: 
…Some of the churches and the mosques are very strong. They have a lot of impact on the 
people, (which) extends to the workplace. We now have religion informing some corporate 
policies. 
This is anticipated given that Syed and Van Buren (2014) note that the dominant religion in a society 
influences the socio-economic practices in that society. But the implication of religion on economic 
policies such as corporate governance cannot be isolated. While religious principles can trigger good 
corporate governance (Jamali et al., 2008), our data suggests otherwise. E2 notes that: 
As an executive, I have witnessed instances where board members are interested in employing 
someone because he belongs to the same religion. This creates a problem of fairness, which is 
key to corporate governance. 
C3 also comments that: 
There are organisations where general prayers called fellowship takes place every morning. 
These sessions forge employee bonding, at the expense of others who do not belong to that 
religion. This tends to have implications for (the) workplace dynamic. 
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E2 and C3’s statements frustrate the principles of fairness, equality and transparency that underpin 
corporate governance. Despite similarities in underlying principles, our data highlight inconsistencies 
between religion and corporate governance. However, C3’s comments validate the components of 
normative and cultural-cognitive pillars of institutions (see Scott, 2014). In Scott’s (2014) normative 
pillar of institutions, the basis of order is ‘binding expectations’. In corporations with substantial 
religious presence, it is easier to engage the normative instrumentality of religion to entrench order as 
against the use of regulation. Institutional voids in the system weaken regulatory effectiveness, but in 
contrast, the normative notion seeks to impose constraints on social behaviour (North, 1990) while 
equally empowering and enabling social action. Essentially, religion provides the normative medium 
that encourages agents to do what they are supposed to do (Scott, 2014) as against dependence on 
coercive rules. This links with the experiential-expressive proposition of religion (Lindbeck, 1984) 
which views religion as indicators of inner feelings and orientations. 
Regardless of the positives in ‘binding expectations’, individual conduct in corporate 
environments may conflict with desired expectations. Scott (2014) engages the cultural-cognitive pillar 
of institutions to explain this concern, noting that external cultural frameworks influence internal 
interpretive processes of individuals. This challenges the influence of religion while reinforcing the 
effect of the institutional environment on corporate performance.   
Corporate Governance and Religious Principles 
Religion reforms the behaviour of its devotees (Howe, 2005; Elson et al., 2007). As it preaches fairness 
and equity, a religious person should embrace corporate governance given that the ethos of religion link 
with those of corporate governance (Harrison, 2006). R6 shares this view: 
…I believe that religion should promote good corporate governance. The essence of religion is 
to preach (principles) such as love for your neighbour, good behaviour, respect for humanity, 
etc. Corporate governance will benefit when (stakeholders) imbibe these (principles).   
Based on R6’s comment and the high religiosity amongst Nigerians, stakeholders should display strong 
levels of corporate governance compliance. This ties with Amaeshi et al. (2006), proposing that the 
religious disposition of Nigerians should toughen their opposition to corporate vices such as corruption, 
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favouritism, among others. However, literature (Ukiwo, 2003; Abioje, 2011; Sampson, 2014) and our 
data (E3, E4, E11, R2, R5 and C2) allude that corporate governance in Nigeria has not benefitted from 
the high religiosity in Nigeria. E11 states that: 
You may identify some form of religious engagement in some corporations, but I do not think 
this has had any direct relationship to the overall performance of such organisation. Religion 
and corporate governance are quite distinct. 
The view by E11 connects with Aldohni’s (2014) which imply that religion cannot provide the morality 
fix that corporate governance may require. In fact, the boundary of religion is noted in its intellectual 
definition (see Harrison, 2006). Religion focuses on the belief in an object or being. Its link to corporate 
governance builds on an alternative view of religion i.e. the functional perspective. This perspective 
advocates that religion serves broader functions beyond the intellectual sphere. Though we 
acknowledge that it may be appropriate to control for other variables, the corporate governance 
literature in Nigeria suggests that high religiosity in Nigerians is yet to give rise to the desired effect on 
the country’s corporate governance.           
Stakeholder Attitude 
The challenges confronting corporate governance in Nigeria centres on shareholder attitude. According 
to Ahunwan (2002, pp. 271), ‘there appears to be a certain built-in stubbornness in the attitude of the 
typical Nigerian’, that upsets governance codes and induces unethical behaviours (Daodu, Nakpodia, 
& Adegbite, 2017).  Religion provides the mechanism that curbs such behaviours. On the contrary, 
Abioje (2011) stated that religion in Nigeria has suffered from the undesirable effects of the attitude 
described in Ahunwan (2002). This reiterates how the institutional environment affects the belief system 
of individuals, as explained in Scott’s (2014) cultural-cognitive institutional pillar. This affects the 
institutional frameworks designed to foster good corporate governance. C1 allude to this view: 
I think the church in this country has a …subtle effect on making our systems not to work 
effectively. …I found out that the more religious we become, the weaker our institutions…The 
behaviour (of devotees) is the antithesis of what (religion) is about. I feel that …religion has a 
(way) of not allowing our institutions to work effectively. 
The comment admits a gap in the attitude of Nigerians in religious settings (churches or mosques) 
compared to their behaviour outside religious spheres (e.g. in companies). In explaining this irregularity, 
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Varian (1990) suggested that economic preferences typically shape the decisions of stakeholders. The 
Marxian analysis also indicates that selfishness or material gain motivate humans (Becker, 1974) hence 
economic preferences characteristically overwhelm religious doctrines. R6 supports the view: 
Poverty is a major reason why many people go to churches in this country. Many people go to 
church in search of alternative means to improve their economic well-being. 
From the above statement, the overriding motive for patronising religion is the pursuit of economic 
security. With the passage of time, an increasing number of stakeholders have adopted this idea given 
that, as Scott (2014) notes, other types of behaviour are inconceivable. The notion of economic well-
being at the expense of religion gains momentum and becomes routinized. These routines are 
subsequently taken for granted, developing as the predictor of compliance. Considering the high 
religiosity in Nigeria, stakeholders (mostly religious adherents) produce these behaviours in corporate 
environments. This manifests in the various agency-related corporate scandals (e.g. Cadbury Nigeria – 
see Abdullahi et al., 2010) as managers concentrate on maximising their returns to the detriment of 
shareholders and the firm. 
Further, Scott (2014) used the concept of orthodoxy to explain the prevailing logic employed 
in rationalising the preceding action. Orthodoxy examines the perceived correctness and soundness of 
the belief embedding an action (Scott, 2014). As social actors, Ahunwan (2002) stressed the yearning 
of the typical Nigerian agent to circumvent rules. While it is necessary to note that some possess these 
beliefs but not by others, the attitude described in Ahunwan (2002) has gained orthodoxy as some 
stakeholders regard it to be correct and sound. This challenge intensifies in countries where institutional 
elements are not only weak (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011) but also suffers from systemic corruption. 
Systemic Corruption    
Corruption is widespread in Nigeria, such that it is extolled as a national culture (Ojukwu & Shopeju, 
2010). Nigeria occupies the 136th position in a corruption perception survey involving 176 countries 
(Transparency International, 2016). Participants admit that the influence, form and magnitude of 
corruption in Nigeria are worrisome. E10 supports the assertion:  
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Corruption is established in our system, and it has massive negative implications for the 
performance of corporate governance in the country.  
Widespread corruption in Nigeria suggests that there is an underlying logic, which supports its 
prevalence in the country. Scott (2014) presented common beliefs or shared logic of actions as an 
indicator of the cultural-cognitive pillar of institutions. These arise as common understandings develop. 
Influential economic agents construct these understandings in weak institutional contexts (Adegbite, 
Amaeshi and Nakajima, 2013). Nakpodia et al. (2016) traced corruption in Nigeria to the activities of 
its elites. The repetitive patterns of corruption have gradually become habitualised and rationalised thus 
attracting wider interest and ‘patronage’.   
The ills of corruption have encouraged the examination of its effect on religion. Ko and Moon 
(2014) indicate that high religiosity countries are more likely to suffer from corruption hence corruption 
impair religious principles. Ojukwu and Shopeju (2010) note that corruption has thrived in Nigeria 
following growing insensitivity towards integrity, morals and character (which are core to religion). 
Indeed, wealth accumulation overwhelms the pursuit of integrity and character (Ahunwan, 2002). This 
affirms Varian’s (1990) view that religious preferences pale in importance when compared to the 
economic desires of shareholders. This has accounted for increased corporate corruption in Nigeria 
(Abdullahi et al., 2010). R8 states that: 
A major reason for corporate governance is to address corruption in the corporate environment. 
But in a country, such as ours where corruption has become a way of life, the practice of 
corporate governance will constantly be challenged. 
The relationship between corruption and corporate governance in developing economies have enjoyed 
a considerable coverage. Literature has reported a strong relationship between corporate governance 
and corruption (Caron, Ficici & Richter, 2012). On the one hand, they show that organisations in highly 
corrupt societies lack efficient corporate governance systems. On the other hand, economies with 
deficient corporate governance and low degree of regulatory compliance provide a system that allows 
corruption to thrive. Adegbite (2012) revealed that the concerns regarding the relationship between 
corporate governance and corruption identified in Caron et al. (2012) exist in corporate Nigeria. 
Nonetheless, Adegbite (2015) suggested that elites, including those in religious environments, trigger 
corruption in Nigeria. 
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Religious Herding 
Religious herding, as a generic category, summarises the sub-categories linked to the activities of 
religious leaders. These sub-categories are discussed next. 
Growing Influence of Religious Leaders 
Preceding analysis signifies that religiosity among Nigerians has not benefitted corporate governance, 
due to poor application of religious principles. Even so, various factors continue to spur increasing 
religious awareness (Ukiwo, 2003). Central to these factors are religious leaders (Onapajo, 2012). A 
BBC News survey revealed that 85% of Nigerians trust their religious leaders (Ferrett, 2005). Similarly, 
Ukiwo (2003) asserted that most Nigerians prefer to meet a religious leader if they had a problem. By 
influencing the consciousness of devotees, religious elites have strengthened their significance beyond 
religious domain. R3, however, identifies a concern: 
… (Religion) is supposed to be a moderator or check on people’s behaviour but it has not lived 
up to expectation. There have been many instances of unethical behaviours on the part of 
religious leaders. Unfortunately, many of the followers have followed suit. 
The above comment highlights a herd mentality. Herd mentality reflects the natural tendency to act in 
line with what is currently popular (Beach & Rose, 2005), showing how people are influenced by their 
peers to embrace certain behaviours (Jin et al., 2013). This is consistent with the mimetic postulation 
(see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2014) as agents, albeit subconsciously, imitate other people. The 
extent of imitation is defined by socioeconomic consequences that permit environmentally constructed 
uncertainties (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In developing economies, low economic power, high death 
rates, social inequalities and poverty amplify the prospects of imitation. In these environments, religion 
provides succour to citizens (Ukiwo, 2003) thereby intensifying dependence on religious groups. This 
behaviour, over time, encourages mimetism as devotees exhibit similar traits as their leaders. This 
produces a herd behaviour, promoted by the incapability of devotees to question their religious leaders 
(Jin et al., 2013). Emile Durkheim, an advocate of functional religion, also inferred religious herding, 
noting that religion reinforces collective conscience and maintenance of social interrelation. 
Consequently, Durkheim elucidated that taking part in religious activities binds individuals together, 
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reminding them that they are part of a single moral community to which they owe their loyalty. This 
may produce an irrational group behaviour that finds its way into corporate settings. 
The problems with religious herding exacerbate given that the ethical stance of some religious 
leaders has been questioned (Abioje, 2005) owing inconsistencies in their actions vis-à-vis corporate 
governance. For example, Udama (2013) reports that many religious outfits operate inadequate 
accounting systems designed to mask the financial accountability of their leaders. This frustrates 
corporate governance as procedures established to help investors generate wealth (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997) are exploited. This underlines how religion could obstruct responsible corporate governance 
(Sommer et al., 2013). It also produces a systemic corporate governance concern as internal 
stakeholders (who are mostly religious adherents) adopt these practices in their decision-making.  
Social Profiling 
Our data reveal that the activities of religious leaders demand an examination of their social profiling 
aspirations. Nigerians commit significant resources towards the maintenance of their social status. This 
is reflected in the high score for power distance in Hofstede cultural framework (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
The society assumes that individuals are ‘not equal’ hence subordinates expect to be ‘told what to do,’ 
while the boss is permitted to exhibit autocratic tendencies. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2004) 
describes this as ‘ascription,’ stating that in such societies, power, title and position matter, and these 
‘privileges’ define behaviour. Those that possess these privileges act with less restraint compared to 
those without such privileges. Hence, the possession of these rights enhances social status but, 
according to E3, creates a problem: 
…some people believe that (not everything, including human beings, is) equal. …This 
perception influences …their action: be it in private, public, (for example). …why would some 
people drive against traffic when others are not supposed to? 
Social profiling in developing economies leads to the social inequality exploited by the ‘privileged few’. 
Contrastingly, corporate governance principles demand that the concerns of all stakeholders are given 
due attention i.e. equality. The problem is that regulations such as the rule of law accommodate the 
excesses of the privileged few in weak institutional environments (Omololu, 2007). This allows 
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individuals at the top of the social ladder (e.g. religious leaders) to manage the expectations of their 
followers, and simultaneously extend their influence on other economic sectors.  
An emergent theme from the above-mentioned is regulatory abuse. A major challenge of 
corporate governance in Nigeria is the ineffective regulatory enforcement (Adegbite 2012; Nakpodia et 
al., 2016). Amaeshi et al. (2006) enlightened that low literacy levels strengthen this challenge hence 
organisations rely on a narrow ‘knowledge bank’. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) informed that when 
organisational expertise is poor, and goals are ambiguous, organisations model themselves after other 
elements. This explains why organisations in Nigeria exhibit the preferences of socio-economic agents 
(Adegbite, 2012) such as religious leaders. While the potential for conflict in this arrangement is 
apparent, mimetic isomorphism may assist in establishing social order. Functional religion theorists 
argue that social consensus (shared norms and values) makes order possible. The benefits that accrue 
to adherents in attaining social consensus, especially in poor societies, not only enhances the power of 
religious leaders but also incentivise devotees to align with religious elites.       
Religious Leaders in the Corporate Space  
On account of their wealth and followership (Abioje, 2011; Ajaegbu, 2012), religious leaders are 
occupying executive positions in corporate Nigeria despite their lack of the requisite skill set and 
experience required for such appointments. Further, they engage their social power as a pressure 
instrument in corporations hence devotees are often sympathetic to their views i.e. herd behaviour. C3 
identifies another challenge linked to their growing followership:  
The (manner) in which some of them present themselves …smacks of arrogance. They act as if 
they are gods themselves. They cannot be challenged thereby contradicting what corporate 
governance is about …a system of checks and balances. 
Solomon (2013) affirmed that corporate governance is a system of checks and balances i.e. a mechanism 
ensuring that power is not concentrated in an individual or group. In Nigeria, C3, E7 and R7 stated that 
religious elites recognise that the pursuit of economic empowerment by adherents underpin their search 
for religion. Religious leaders, specifically those with substantial corporate investments, offer both 
religious and economic emancipation. This enables them to shut down the check and balance 
mechanism, as they wield the ‘carrot and stick’ to induce or rebuke stakeholders. This creates a weak 
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corporate governance system as the counterbalancing instrument of religious affiliation is employed to 
achieve economic goals by charting a direction that contradicts good corporate governance. This 
informs why some respondents suggested that religion is a means to an end. 
Religion as ‘Means to an End.’ 
Data from participants provide the rationale to advocate that religion in Nigeria is a ‘means to an end’ 
rather than an ‘end’ as the description by James Martineau connotes. While this describes the perception 
and practice of religion amongst Nigerians, it ties with the functional view of religion (see Harrison, 
2006). Functional religion relegates what makes religion distinctive and different i.e. the supernatural. 
In Durkheim’s words, religion is an expression of social cohesion. For religious leaders in Nigeria, this 
provides the rationale to engage religion in a manner that departs from its affective postulation. Indeed, 
E2 contextualised the religious beliefs of some Nigerians: 
People take God for granted. (They) Believe in God but what they do is not the business of God. 
They do things according to their whims and caprices, and greed in most cases guides most of 
their (actions).  
The above statement confirms that the quest for economic emancipation drives religious consciousness 
among religious leaders. Interestingly, stakeholders (adherents) also derive benefits from religious 
activities (e.g. social belonging) which are not necessarily consistent with belief in the supernatural. 
While this advances social cohesion, this disposition towards religion may affect stakeholders’ capacity 
to imbibe the principles that embed corporate governance in the long term. This shows that religiosity 
cannot function as a determinant for good corporate governance (Aldohni, 2014). It also contradicts 
Grullon et al. (2009) and Gul and Ng (2016) which suggest that in environments with a high degree of 
religiosity, regulations (an instrument of corporate governance) yield better outcomes.  
Practical Implications of Study and Conclusion 
Our data show that religion influences the behaviour of Nigerians. Religion provides utility to citizens 
in countries where poverty is widespread (Coşgel & Miceli, 2009). Norris and Inglehart (2011) also 
note that religious organisations offer essential services such as education and healthcare in poor 
countries. Our data indicate that Nigerians believe in God (intellectual view) (Harrison, 2006) but this 
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belief reacts to the functions (or benefits) accessible from religion and religious affiliations (functional 
view). Lindbeck (1984) describes this as ‘experiential-expressive’ i.e. where religion is an indicator of 
stakeholder’s behavioural preferences and orientations. This implies that many Nigerians have ignored 
the religious elements (similar to corporate governance principles) that underpin broader perspectives 
of religion. For instance, E1 stated that ‘we don’t have the underlying religious commitment; so much 
of (the) religious posturing is (shallow)’. This affirms that stakeholders are yet to embrace the basics of 
religion (affective religion).  
The preceding provides a base for exploring corporate governance practices amongst Nigerian 
stakeholders. While the challenge in applying basic religious principles (e.g., honesty, morality and 
reciprocity) have undermined corporate governance, corruption and other related vices have crept into 
stakeholder’s consciousness. Indeed, the pervasiveness of these vices has overwhelmed the 
manifestation of sound religious doctrines (Abioje, 2011; Sampson, 2014). Weaknesses in the country’s 
institutional environment intensify the inconsistency between religious practices and corporate 
governance system. The literature (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011; Nakpodia et al., 2016) suggests that 
the capacity of the institutional environment in Nigeria to prompt good corporate governance is affected 
by the overwhelming influences of corruption.  
The problems in the institutional environment and its effects on religion and corporate 
governance demand a strategic intervention such as a reorientation and refocus of stakeholders to 
embrace and imbibe morals, good values and principles. This obliges the transformation of operators 
(Harrison, 2006) that require stakeholders to internalise religious principles. Max Weber proposed 
similar conceptualisation. Weber explains that religion is a state of consciousness, noting that 
stakeholder’s capacity to engage religious potentials for societal good requires a ‘transformation of 
consciousness’ (Sampson, 2014, pp. 324). This is important in developing economies where literacy 
concerns are prevalent. In societies where by institutional characteristics shape the dominant 
consciousness amongst stakeholders, a transformation of that consciousness is necessary towards 
improving the dominant social paradigms.  The transformation, which must be literacy-driven, must 
stress that religious principles could provide the necessary lever for good corporate governance.  
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This paper focused on the link between religion and corporate governance. The literature 
investigating the relationship between religion and corporate governance have produced varied results. 
The findings in Guiso et al. (2003) and Mohammed et al. (2015) show that religion positively affects 
corporate governance. In contrast, Sommer et al. (2013) and Aldohni (2014) demonstrate that religion 
can undermine responsible corporate behaviour. Another strand of literature (Jamali et al., 2008; Hilary 
& Hui, 2009; El Ghoul et al., 2012) indicated that the relationship between religion and corporate 
governance is context-dependent. For instance, Kuran (2009) and Norris and Inglehart (2011) expressed 
that in less-religious countries, the relationship between religion and corporate governance is weak. In 
enriching the extant literature, we articulate the practical implications of our study.  
First, corporate governance in Nigeria adopts a largely principle-based regulation (Nakpodia et 
al., 2016). This approach engages a set of voluntary codes and best practices to oversee corporate 
governance (Nakpodia et al., 2016). Sama and Shoaf (2005) note that principles such as impartiality, 
transparency and accountability support principles-based regulation. Trevino and Nelson (2010) 
contend that a system based on principles is better able to manage the more seemingly silent activities 
of economic agents as it relies on morality, ethics and values. The principles underlying both concepts 
explain the nexus between religion and corporate governance. For instance, corporate governance 
norms identified in OECD (2004) such as responsibility and transparency were noted in Cremers (2016) 
as religious principles. We, therefore, argue that, in a high religiosity environment, a principle-based 
regulatory regime can accelerate the emergence of a robust corporate governance.   
Second, our data show that corporate governance in Nigeria has not profited from the religious 
disposition of stakeholders. The ineffectiveness of its principle-based regulation accounts for the well-
documented challenges confronting its corporate governance. We maintain that the inability to engage 
religious principles portend significant implications for a principle-based regulation. We posit that the 
poor application of religious principles has contributed to the challenges confronting corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Therefore, as part of broader strategies to stimulate corporate governance in 
Nigeria, it is important to pursue a regulatory model that embraces both principle-based and rule-based 
regulations (see Nakpodia et al., 2016). 
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Third, Scott (2014) provided three pillars of institutions. Given that these pillars are a 
continuum, moving from the legally enforced to the taken-for granted (Hoffman, 2001). Scott (2014) 
noted the need to differentiate these pillars. This will help in distinguishing its several component 
elements while identifying the different underlying assumptions and mechanisms underlying each pillar. 
However, our findings highlight the difficulty in understanding the pillars as distinct elements. In fact, 
our results accentuate the interconnectedness and relationship between the pillars. For instance, we 
relied on the features of both normative and culturally-cognitive institutional pillars to examine the 
attitude of stakeholders. We, therefore, conclude that it is appropriate to perceive these institutional 
pillars as mutually reinforcing in the emergence of social cohesiveness. This is consistent with 
D’Andrade’s (1984) description of the overdetermined system i.e. a system where social sanctions and 
pressure for conformity are likely to spur the emergence of a robust directive mechanism.    
Lastly, the literature investigating religion and corporate governance have adopted various 
institutional contexts, but we acknowledge that developed economies have provided the contextual base 
for the generality of the studies. Developing countries are considerably isolated from this genre of 
literature. This is particularly worrisome bearing in mind that nearly all the countries with the Top 10 
religious populations in the world (see Table 1) are developing economies. Therefore, engaging with 
Nigeria, this paper not only deepens the corporate governance literature examining the nexus between 
religion and corporate governance but also addresses the scant literature investigating corporate 
governance among developing economies. 
 
In concluding this paper, we examined the connection between religion and corporate 
governance. We also explored the effect of the institutional environment on the relationship. As 
indicated in Tracey (2012) and Volonté (2015), this area of research has suffered neglect. Tracey (2012) 
admitted that there is little understanding of the dynamics of religious organisational forms or their 
effects on broader social processes. Engaging the institutional environment in Nigeria, this paper 
maintains that the capacity of religion to contribute to a resilient corporate governance is not accelerated 
by the level of religiosity in that environment.  
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Further, we demonstrate the difficulty in how stakeholder conduct ensures that corporate 
governance in Nigeria is unable to access the benefits inherent in internalising sound religious principles. 
This is the focus of the first generic category from our data. The second generic category focused on 
the influence of religious leaders on corporate governance. Widespread corruption and poverty 
encourage stakeholders (including religious leaders and their devotees) to engage in the rational 
ordering of individual preferences (Iannaccone, 1998). Rationality creates a conflict that allows 
stakeholders to embrace a consequentialist (‘the end justifies the means’) ideology (Vallentyne, 2009) 
at the expense of sound religious principles.  
Our findings rely on insights from the Nigerian stakeholder and their attitude towards religion. 
However, with respect to our findings, a limitation of this paper relates to the spread of participants 
with reference to the Nigerian business environment. Whereas this paper examined the influence of 
religion on corporate governance in Nigerian corporations, participants were not drawn from all sectors 
of the Nigerian economy as classified by the Nigerian Stock Exchange. This may raise concerns 
regarding the generalisation of our study outcomes. To mitigate this limitation, participants included 
consultants who have managed various corporate governance assignments in the other sectors isolated 
in our study. Thus, their contributions reflect practices in the sectors not covered in this study. 
Findings from our study reinforce the importance of isolating religion from spirituality. 
Spirituality entails the embeddedness of religious principles amongst stakeholders over the long term. 
According to Harrison (2006), spirituality can only be associated with religion when adherents imbibe 
religious emotions (affective religion) such that a positive transformation in human behaviour emerges. 
Therefore, in articulating an area for further research, future studies can examine the relationship 
between spirituality and corporate governance. Such study will determine factors/variables of 
spirituality and possibly, a survey that reveals the most spiritual countries in the world, in order to 
provide an anchor to support the analysis. We anticipate that this would provoke further scholarship 
into the relationship between religion and corporate governance especially among developing 
economies where relevant literature remains sparse. 
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Appendix - Interview Guide 
 
1. Interview Background 
a. As a stakeholder in corporate governance in Nigeria, how would you assess the state 
of corporate governance in Nigeria? 
b. What are the main challenges confronting corporate governance in the country? 
 
2. Religious Influences 
a. In your view, would you consider Nigeria as a high religiosity country? 
b. Do you think that religion have affected the practice of corporate governance in 
Nigeria (positively or negatively)? 
c. What specific areas of religion would say have affected corporate governance in 
Nigeria? 
d. Can religion engender good corporate governance practices? 
a. If yes, how? 
b. If no, why not? 
e. In your view, how would you assess the issue of corruption on the relationship 
between corporate governance and religion? 
f. Is there any other factor you may want to share with me that affects the relationship 
between religion and corporate governance? 
 
3. Necessary Reforms 
a. In your opinion, what governance reforms are necessary to improve corporate 
governance in the Nigerian business environment considering its high degree of 
religiosity? 
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